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DEVELOPING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT FOR THOSE
"LEAST DESERVING" OF PUNISHMENT: STATUTORY
MANDATORY MINIMUMS FOR NON-CAPITAL
OFFENSES CAN BE "CRUEL AND UNUSUAL" WHEN
IMPOSED ON MENTALLY RETARDED OFFENDERS
TIMOTHY CONE*
The development of the Supreme Court of the United States' jurisprudence interpreting the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" has
been surprisingly uneven: a good number of cases have been decided regarding the
imposition of the death penalty;1 by contrast, the caselaw respecting punishments
less severe than death is much less developed.2 The Supreme Court's recent
application of the proportionality principle-the principle that "grossly disproportionate punishments are unconstitutional" 3-in Atkins v. Virginia4 holds promise for
the development of Eighth Amendment caselaw in non-capital cases. Invoking the
proportionality principle, Atkins held that the execution of the mentally retarded is
unconstitutional.5 The Court reasoned that, categorically, mentally retarded
offenders should not be subject to punishments intended for more deserving
offenders.6 This reasoning can be extended to strike down non-capital punishments
on proportionality grounds. This article argues that, in light of Atkins, the imposition
of statutory mandatory minimums on mentally retarded offenders violates the Eighth
Amendment when the result is a disproportionate sentence.
I. BACKGROUND: THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE APPLIED TO
CAPITAL CASES VERSUS NON-CAPITAL CASES
In capital punishment cases, the Supreme Court of the United States has limited
the types of crimes punishable by death. In addition, having ruled in the 1970s that
the death penalty cannot be left to the open-ended discretion of the sentencer, 8 the
Court went on in decisions in ensuing decades to lay down fairly particularized
* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Southern District of Florida. J.D. Yale Law School (1984); B.A.
Haverford College (1979). This article is not meant to express the views of the Federal Public Defender's Office.
I gratefully acknowledge help from Dean John C. Jeffries, Jr., and from Professors Douglas A. Berman and James
W. Ellis. This article is dedicated to the memory of Jdr6me Baverez, Avocat A la Cour, my friend-Deo gracias!
1. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 360 (1995) (reviewing the host of
modem Supreme Court cases governing capital punishment and noting that they give the impression of "enormous
regulatory effort").
2. See Note, Legislative Deference in Eighth Amendment Capital Sentencing Challenges: The
Constitutional Inadequacy of the Current Judicial Approach, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 467, 468 (1999)
("challenges to the imposition of the death penalty dominate the judicial landscape in the Eighth Amendment
context").
3. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 377 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.
263, 274 n.11 (1980)). An example of how the proportionality principle works can be seen in Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277 (1983), where the Supreme Court struck down a sentence of life imprisonment as excessive punishment
for a recidivist's offense of uttering a no account check.
4. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the death penalty is unconstitutional when applied to mentally retarded
offenders because, categorically, mentally retarded offenders are less deserving of punishment).
5. Id. at 321.
6. Id. at 318-21.
7. E.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty is excessive punishment for rape); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty is excessive punishment for unintentional taking of life).
8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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guidelines governing the proper consideration of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. 9
By contrast, Eighth Amendment caselaw addressing non-capital sentences is
much less developed. Since 1983, when it struck down a life sentence for a recidivist
convicted of check fraud,' ° the Supreme Court has never held a prison term
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment." "Successful challenges to the
proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly rare."' 2 Indeed, a
majority of Justices have yet to agree on a test by which to measure "proportionality"; each new case seems to produce a new approach to this question. 3 These
inconsistent analyses leave4"unclear" the "precise contours" of the Eighth Amendment in non-capital cases.'
"Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison
term differs from one of only a year or two.'

5

This "qualitative difference between

death and all other penalties" became the Supreme Court's justification in Harmelin
v. Michigan for not requiring any consideration of aggravating and mitigating

9. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 1, at 355 (assessing the impact of the Supreme Court's capital
punishment jurisprudence).
10. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
11. Since deciding Solem in 1983, the Supreme Court has decided only three non-capital Eighth Amendment
challenges: Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality
opinion); and Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
12. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 21 (plurality opinion) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
13. In 1983, the Supreme Court stated that the proportionality test involved the consideration of three factors:
the inherent gravity of the offense, the sentences imposed for similarly grave offenses in the same jurisdiction, and
sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. Since Solem, however, a
majority of Justices have not endorsed this test or agreed on a new approach to proportionality issues.
In Harmelin,Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter agreed that the Eighth Amendment embodies only
a "narrow" proportionality principle. 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring). But Justices White, Blackmun, and
Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, did not agree that the principle was as narrow. Id. at 1009 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); id. at 1027 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy, rejecting the dissent's criticism that he was
effectively "eviscerat[ing]" and "abandon[ing]" Solem, wrote that an analysis of the second and third Solem factors
was unnecessary if the defendant did not make a threshold showing of gross disproportionality. Id. at 1005 (citing
id. at 1018, 1020 (White, J., dissenting)).
Justice Kennedy identified the following relevant principles for a proportionality analysis: "the primacy
of the legislature, the variety of legitimate penological schemes, the nature of our federal system,.. .the requirement
that proportionality review be guided by objective factors [and the fact that the] Eighth Amendment does not require
strict proportionality between crime and sentence." Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This
analysis "guide[d]" the plurality in Ewing, but neither the plurality in Ewing nor Justice Kennedy's Harmelin
concurrence had the support of a majority of Justices, and therefore neither constitutes binding precedent in the
Supreme Court or in the lower courts. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983); see, e.g., DeStefano v.
Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397,418-19 (2d Cir. 2001). But cf.United States v. Brant, 62 F.3d 367,
368 (11 th Cir. 1995) (adopting the Harmelin "threshold" test).
Disagreement about the proper proportionality test is also evident in the dissents in Ewing: Justice
Stevens' dissent joined Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, though noting that the Solem analysis, not Justice
Kennedy's Harmelin approach (which Justice Breyer followed in Ewing) "seem[ed] more directly on point." 538
U.S. at 33 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer's dissent noted this point and stated that he was only
following Justice Kennedy's Harmelin approach "for present purposes." Id. at 36 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
This article suggests that a proportionality test should focus on whether a punishment measurably
advances legitimate penological goals. See infra notes 76 and 114 and accompanying text. See also Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317-21 (2002) (evaluating whether the execution of mentally retarded offenders advances
penological goals).
14. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-72 ("our proportionality decisions have not been clear or consistent in all
respects") (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
15. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995 (death penalty
is "unique") (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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factors in non-capital sentencings, even though this inquiry is required before the
death penalty can be imposed.' However, looking at the criminal justice system

16. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995. Harmelin left standing a life-sentence without parole for a defendant
convicted of possession of 672 grams of cocaine. Id. at961. However, only a three-Justice concurrence, authored
by Justice Kennedy, agreed that this was where the Eighth Amendment drew the proportionality line. Id. at 996
(Kennedy, J., concurring). Two Justices declined to accept the premise that the Eighth Amendment contains a
proportionality guarantee. Id. at 961. Four Justices-one more than joined the Kennedy concurrence-agreed that
the sentence was disproportionate. Id. at 1008, 1027. Five Justices, however, did agree that the mandatory nature
of the sentence did not make it unconstitutional, declining to extend to non-capital cases the "individualized" inquiry
into aggravating and mitigating factors required in capital cases. Id. at 994-95. This became the sole holding of
Harmelin. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court decides a case and
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.") (citation
omitted); cf.Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 708 (8th Cir. 2001) ("Five Justices agreed that a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment without parole for possession of 672 grams, which was the defendant's first offense,
was not cruel and unusual.").
One can question whether Harmelin's reliance on this "qualitative difference" was merely a
rationalization; as Professor Frank Bowman recently observed, the Supreme Court's "real reason for refusing to
extend capital punishment-like proportionality analysis to non-capital penalty schemes probably has as much to do
with the practical difficulties of creating useful standards as it does with the 'qualitative' difference between death
and long imprisonment." Frank 0. Bowman ll, Ewing v. California: The Supreme Court Takes a Walk on "Three
Strikes" Laws...and That's Fine, JURIST (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/foruml
forumnewl03.php. Bowman noted that recidivist sentencing schemes have many variations of punishment,
depending on the severity of both past and present offenses. Bowman states,
Across the country, the length of the mandatory sentence called for by various recidivist statutes
ranges from as little as five years to as much as life imprisonment. The California regime alone
provides five different ways of calculating the applicable minimum sentence depending on the
defendant's prior record and the nature of the triggering offense.
Id. He argues that it is therefore "prohibitively difficult" to pin down the point at which a recidivist sentence
becomes excessive, and even more difficult for courts to avoid creating an unintelligible "patchwork" of decisions.
Bowman views Ewing as a "blessing in disguise" because it focuses attention back on state legislatures, which can
do more than courts to fix the problem of excessive sentences. Id. However, after the unsuccessful challenge in 1991
in Harmelinof a statute mandating a life sentence for simple possession of cocaine, it took the Michigan legislature
more than ten years before it repealed this law. See News Release, Families Against Mandatory Minimums,
Michigan Legislature Repeals Draconian Mandatory Minimum Drug Sentences (Dec. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.famm.org/nr-sentencingnews_mi_release_1 212_ 02.htm (praising repeal of Michigan sentencing law
that had caused "injustices") (last visited Feb. 23, 2004). Moreover, there is no cause for satisfaction when, as
Bowman puts it, the Supreme Court "takes a walk" in the face of a twenty-five-year sentence for stealing three golf
clubs, which, even for a recidivist, seems patently excessive. See Ewing, 538 U.S. 11, 47 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
("Ewing's recidivist sentence is virtually unique in its harshness for his offense of conviction, and by a considerable
degree.").
In the same vein, Justice Scalia broadly questions the judiciary's ability to "speak intelligently" about the
proportionality of sentences in light of the variety of penological justifications that can underlie a sentence. Id. at
31 (Scalia, J., concurring). He also questions the legitimacy of judges substituting their own subjective values for
the judgment of state legislatures about proportional punishment. Harmelin,501 U.S. at 986 (opinion of Scalia, J.);
see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 341 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Eighth Amendment judgments "should not appear
to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices"); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 854 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I would not substitute our inevitably subjective judgment about the best age at which
to draw a line in the capital punishment context for the judgments of the Nation's legislatures.").
Justice Scalia, therefore, views death penalty jurisprudence as entirely distinct from Eighth Amendment law.
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (the proportionality principle is "an aspect of our death penalty
jurisprudence, rather than a generalizable aspect of Eighth Amendment law"). In Ewing, Justice Scalia maintained
that the Eighth Amendment is not a guarantee against disproportionate sentences. 538 U.S. at 31-32 (Scalia, J.,
concurring, joined by Thomas, J.). But this position cannot be squared with the plain language of the text. The
Amendment also bars "excessive" bails and fines. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This language inherently implicates
proportionality concerns. Since the drafters of the Eighth Amendment clearly foresaw the evil of disproportionate
bails and fines, it seems most unlikely that they did not at the same time envisage that terms of incarceration might
also be excessive. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It 'would be anomalous indeed' to suggest
that the Eighth Amendment makes proportionality review applicable in the context of bail and fines but not in the
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as a whole, it does not make sense for the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments to dissipate when the punishment is less severe than death. 7 Of course,
it is appropriate to give death penalty cases priority, because punishment by death
is the harshest punishment our justice system imposes on an offender. 18 Since
selecting the most extreme option presents a greater risk for extreme results, capital
cases inherently raise questions about whether the punishment fits the crime.' 9 To
avoid extreme, and therefore unacceptable, results,2 ° it was natural for a "narrowing
jurisprudence" to have developed in the specific context of the death penalty to
"ensure that only the most deserving of execution are put to death.'
However, as a majority of Justices now recognize, there is no legal impediment
to applying the "proportionality principle" in both capital 22 and non-capital 23 Eighth

context of other forms of punishment, such as imprisonment.") (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983));
John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionalityof Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L REV. 139, 147 (1986)
("The eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United States forbids excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel
and unusual punishment. The three are obviously related.").
17. Cf. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 579 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("fundamental
constitutional principles cannot alter depending on degrees of sentencing severity") (Sixth Amendment case).
18. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (because death is "unique in its severity and
irrevocability," the Court has been "particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed"); Sinclair v.
State, 657 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 1995) ("Because death is a unique punishment, it is necessary in each case to
engage in a thoughtful, deliberate proportionality review to considerthe totality ofthe circumstancesin a case, and
to compare it with other capital cases.") (emphasis added) (applying Florida law); Bridgette M. Palmer, Note, Death
as a ProportionatePenaltyfor the Rape of a Child. ConsideringOne State's CurrentLaw, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
843, 851 (1999) (noting that in Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court "extended the Eighth Amendment
proportionality review to death penalty cases because punishment of death is 'unique in its severity and
irrevocability'); cf. Aharon Barak, Foreword:A Judge on Judging: The Role ofa Supreme Court in a Democracy,
116 HARv. L. REV. 16, 147 (2002) (noting that some consider the death penalty inherently disproportionate because
the purposes of punishment can be achieved through less extreme action).
19. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 (because death is "unique in its severity and irrevocability," the Court has
been "particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed"); Sinclair,657 So. 2d at 1142 ("Because
death is a unique punishment, it is necessary in each case to engage in a thoughtful, deliberate proportionality review
to consider the totality of the circumstances in a case, and to compare it with other capital cases.") (emphasis
added) (applying Florida law); Note, Death as a ProportionatePenaltyfor the Rape of a Child: ConsideringOne
State's Current Law, supra note 18, at 851 (noting that, in Coker v. Georgia, the Supreme Court extended the
proportionality review of death penalty cases because death is unique in severity and irrevocability); cf. Barak, supra
note 18, at 147 (noting that some consider the death penalty inherently disproportionate because the purposes of
punishment can be achieved through less extreme action).
20. The five Justices who ruled against the defendant in the fractured Harmelin decision nonetheless
explicitly agreed that the Eighth Amendment would apply in "extreme" cases. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001
(Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by O'Connor & Souter, JJ.); id. at 962 (opinion of Scalia, J., & Rehnquist, C.J.)
(conceding that the disproportionality principle would come into play in "extreme" cases).
21. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319. The Supreme Court's "narrowing jurisprudence" has narrowed the application
of the death penalty, but a "narrowing jurisprudence" need not be limited to the death penalty and can, outside the
death penalty context, narrow the range of sentences that are constitutional rather than cruel and unusual.
22. The proportionality precept explains how the Supreme Court, while never banning the death penalty,
has been able to rationalize its limited application. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 308 (1987)
(because state procedures properly focused sentencing discretion, the death penalty was not imposed "wantonly and
freakishly" and, therefore, was not "disproportionate" under the Eighth Amendment); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1018
(White, J., dissenting) ("our capital punishment cases. .do not outlaw death as a mode or method of punishment,
but instead put limits on its application. If the concept of proportionality is downgraded in the Eighth Amendment
calculus, much of this Court's capital penalty jurisprudence will rest on quicksand."); Carol S. Steicker & Jordan
M. Steicker, Let God Sort Them Out: Refining the IndividualizationRequirement in CapitalSentencing, 102 YALE
L.J. 835, 854 (1992) ("most aggravating circumstances serve a proportionality function rather than an
individualizing function [because] they connect punishment to harm and social cost").
23. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24 (applying the "proportionality principle" to assess the validity of a lengthy
sentence of incarceration under California's Three Strikes Law).
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Amendment cases. 24 Legal principles that are first developed in capital cases can
have equal force in non-capital cases; for example, the Supreme Court initially was
only in capital
willing to admit of a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel
26
cases.
criminal
all
in
exists
right
this
that
cases but later found
Moreover, although Supreme Court Justices have repeatedly stated that death is
'27
in reality, for Eighth
a unique punishment in both its "severity and irrevocability,
Amendment purposes, the severity of the death penalty matters much more than its
irrevocability. The irrevocability of the death penalty becomes most relevant when
one assumes that an innocent person has been executed, since the unjust result can
never be altered. 2' But, Eighth Amendment analysis assumes that the defendant is
29
guilty-indeed, in appeals of death sentences, guilty of a heinous crime. Eighth
Amendment proportionality analysis weighs severity similarly in capital and noncapital cases. 3' And, from the standpoint of severity, non-capital penalties can be
more severe and disproportional than capital punishment, because, under certain
3
circumstances, life can be more painful than death. ' "Grossly disproportionate"
sentences (i.e., sentences prohibited under the proportionality principle as excessive)
can occur for a variety of reasons, not all of them having to do with death.
A punishment can be excessive not because the penalty in and of itself is
unacceptably cruel, but primarily because the penalty is harsh in relation to the
conduct at issue. For example, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
proportionality principle would come into play "if a legislature made overtime
32
parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment., Life imprisonment, of course,
is a harsh penalty, but its imposition for the relatively innocuous misconduct of
33
overtime parking would make it not just harsh, but "cruel and unusual.

24. Tallying the opinions of the plurality and the dissent in Ewing v. California,a total of seven Justices now
agree that a "proportionality principle" governs non-capital Eighth Amendment cases. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24
(plurality opinion of O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Kennedy, J.); id. at 36-37 (dissent of Breyer, J.,
joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, JJ.).
25. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674 (1948) (finding that the circumstances did not warrant the
appointment of counsel but recognizing that if the case had involved capital charges the State would have been
required to assign competent counsel to represent the defendant); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that
there is a right to appointed counsel in state capital cases but not in non-capital cases).
26. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 347 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring) (noting the evolution of the right
to counsel from capital to non-capital cases).
27. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187 ("There is no question that death is unique in its severity and
irrevocability.").
28. See, e.g., Crane McClennen, Capital Punishment in Arizona, ARIZ. ATr'Y, Oct. 1992, at 21 ("because
of the irrevocable nature of the death penalty, we need a system that has sufficient safeguards to see that an innocent
person is not executed").
29. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that "those States that still inflict death
reserve it for the most heinous crimes").
30. Compare, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 ("the severity of the appropriate punishment necessarily depends
on the culpability of the offender") (capital case), with Solem, 463 U.S. at 299 (striking down sentence because the
defendant was "treated in the same manner as, or more severely than, criminals who have committed far more
serious crimes") (non-capital case).
31. See Michel de Montaigne, That the Taste of Good and Evil Depends in Large Part on the Opinion We
Have of Them in ESSAYS I, 14, 34 (Donald Frame trans., 1965) (-1577) ("And even as some await [death] trembling
and afraid, others endure it more easily than life.").
32. Rummel, 445 U.S. 263, 274 n.ll (1980).
33. Ewing, 538 U.S at 21 (reaffirming that the Eighth Amendment would "come into play" if the legislature
made overtime parking punishable by life imprisonment).
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Moreover, even if a serious offense were at issue, a diminished mental culpability
can cause an otherwise permissible penalty to become disproportionate.34 Indeed,
this is the crucial holding of the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins-a decision that
promises to reconnect the heretofore disparate tracks of capital and non-capital
Eighth Amendment caselaw.35 Atkins recognizes that the Eighth Amendment
circumscribes the range of punishments that can be imposed on offenders who have
diminished mental culpability. This principle has force outside of capital cases, for
example,36 in cases where the prosecution seeks to impose a mandatory minimum
term of imprisonment on mentally retarded offenders in non-capital cases.
H1. ATKINS CIRCUMSCRIBES THE RANGE OF PERMISSIBLE
PUNISHMENT FOR THE LEAST DESERVING OFFENDERS
Atkins v. Virginia37 held that the Eighth Amendment bars the execution of
mentally retarded persons, thereby overruling the 1989 case of Penry v. Lynaugh.3"
In Penry,39 the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that mental
retardation was a mitigating factor of constitutional significance,4" which had to be
considered by the sentencer in capital cases; 4' but the Court held that the execution
of mentally retarded offenders does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
on "cruel and unusual punishment. 4 2 In overruling Penry, Atkins effectively held
that the mental retardation mitigator was so significant
that it made the mentally
43
retarded categorically ineligible for the death penalty.
Atkins began by noting the line of caselaw holding that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment" invalidates sentences that are

34. The notion that defendants with a lesser mens rea are less deserving of punishment is, of course, a basic
feature of our criminal justice system. See, e.g., Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 400 (1990) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) ("a criminal defendant may be considered less culpable and thus less deserving of severe punishment
if he encountered unusual difficulties in his background, suffers from limited intellectual or emotional resources,
or possesses redeeming qualities") (second emphasis added).
35. The interconnection of capital and noncapital Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is manifest in Atkins,
which, though it involved the death penalty, relied on non-capital cases for the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment embodies a "proportionality precept." 536 U.S. at 311 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910); Harmelin,501 U.S. 957; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 360 (1962)). The interconnection between capital
and non-capital caselaw is also evident outside the Eighth Amendment context. For example, Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584 (2002), a capital case, drew upon Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), a non-capital case, in
holding a sentencing scheme unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment. See also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S.
-,
124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003) (per curiam) ("We cannot say that because the violation occurred in the context of a
capital sentencing proceeding that our precedent requires the opposite result [from the one reached in non-capital
cases].").
36. See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text. The implications of Atkins outside the death penalty
context are not limited to mentally retarded offenders. This article focuses on mentally retarded offenders because
they were the offenders at issue in Atkins.
37. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
38. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
39. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
40. Id. at 328.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 335.
43. See Mark Alan Ozimek, Note, The Casefora More Workable Standardin Death Penalty Jurisprudence:
Atkins v. Virginia and CategoricalExemptions under the Imprudent "Evolving Standardsof Decency" Doctrine,
34 U. TOL. L. REv. 651, 684 (2003) (Atkins changed mental retardation from a "sentence-mitigator" to a basis for
"categorical exemption.").
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"grossly disproportionate."" Applying this "proportionality precept," the Court then
analyzed the proportionality of executing mentally retarded criminals, focusing on
whether the two "penological purposes" of capital punishment, retribution4 5 and
deterrence, 46 are advanced by the execution of the mentally retarded. 47 Retribution
and deterrence are the two principal justifications for punishment, especially when
that punishment is the death penalty.48
For retribution purposes, the Court noted, "the severity of the appropriate
punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the offender., 49 The recent
trend in many states' legislation to eliminate capital punishment for the mentally
retarded, as well as other indicators of public opinion, showed that society now
viewed mentally retarded offenders "as categorically less culpable than the average
criminal." 50 The Justices noted that their own views had also evolved, finding that
51
the "deficiencies" of the mentally retarded "diminish their personal culpability";
and since capital punishment is reserved for "the most deserving of execution," the
Court concluded that it is "excessive" to execute mentally retarded persons.52
As for deterrence, the Court wrote, "the increased severity of the punishment.. .inhibits criminal actors from carrying out their murderous conduct."53 But,
mentally retarded persons are "less likely" than average offenders to "control their
conduct," even when the severity of punishment is increased.54 Hence, executing the
mentally retarded does not measurably further the goal of deterrence.5
Atkins' significance should not be confined to capital punishment. The Court's
willingness to reverse Penry56 plainly did not arise from the nature of the punishment; the severity of death had remained unchanged in the thirteen years since
Penry. Moreover, Atkins involved a murder heinous enough to qualify the defendant
for execution.57 But, the Court did not decide that death was excessive punishment
based on a judgment regarding the relative egregiousness of the defendant's

44. 536 U.S. at 311-13.
45. "Retribution" refers to society's "need to offset a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent 'moral
quality."' Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,408 (1986).
46. "Deterrence refers to the use of punishment to discourage future criminal conduct." Mary Sigler,
Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretionin the Supreme Court's CapitalSentencing Jurisprudence,40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1155 (2003) (citation omitted).
47. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-21.
48. Id. at 318-19.
49. Id. at 319.

50. Id. at 316.
51. Id. at 318.
52. Id. at 319.
53. Id. at 320.
54. Id.
55. Id. It bears noting that the reasoning in Atkins places a limitation on the deference that the judiciary
ordinarily shows toward legislative choices on how to achieve penological goals through sentencing. Ordinarily,
the determination of the maximum possible sentence for a given offense is "purely a matter of legislative
prerogative." Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274. Accordingly, the judiciary gives "substantial deference" to such legislative
determinations. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290; see also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 ("Of course, the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment must be applied with an awareness of the limited role to be played by the courts. This does not mean
that judges have no role to play, for the Eighth Amendment is a restraint upon the exercise of legislative power.").
56. Penry, 492 U.S. 302.
57. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Atkins shot the victim "one, two, three, four, five, six,
seven, eight times in the thorax, chest, abdomen, arms, and legs.").
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conduct; 58 i.e., the severity of Atkins' crime did not figure into the Court's Eighth
Amendment analysis.5 9
In short, the Court grounded its ruling on the offender's lessened mental
culpability-not on the lack of egregiousness of the offensive conduct or the nature
of the death penalty itself.' The lessened mental culpability of the offender drove
the Court's proportionality analysis. By finding the mentally retarded "categorically
less culpable than the average criminal, ' 61 the Court differentiated that group, not
62
just from the most deserving offenders for whom death is a permitted punishment,
but even from "average" offenders, for whom death is impermissible punishment.63
Atkins recognized that an ordinarily permissible punishment can be unconstitutional,
nonetheless, as to certain categories of less deserving offenders. 64 In effect, the Court
recognized a category of offenders "least deserving" of punishment. The "narrowing" effect of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence drew upon a recognition that the
diminished mental culpability of an offender circumscribes the range of constitutionally permissible punishment. 65 This principle has significant implications outside the
death penalty context, 66 particularly in non-capital cases where the applicable
sentence is a minimum term of incarceration mandated by statute.67
III. THE ATKINS PROPORTIONALITY TEST APPLIED TO NONCAPITAL,
MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES
In Harmelin,the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the contention "that
a sentence which is not otherwise cruel and unusual becomes so simply because it
is mandatory. 68 In effect, the Court held that the "mandatory" nature of a sentence
does not make it unconstitutional. However sound this holding may be,69 it does not

58. As noted supra and infra, notes 57-63 and accompanying text, the Atkins opinion focused on the
diminished culpability of the mentally retarded generally and did not address the circumstances of the defendant's
crime.
59. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 338 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for presenting an "abridged"
version of the murder).
60. Id. at 319.
61. Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 319-20 (noting that the cold calculus of premeditated murderers places these offenders "at the
opposite end of the spectrum" from the mentally retarded).
63. Id. at 319 ("If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction
available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offender surely does not merit that form of
retribution.").
64. See Note, Implementing Atkins, 116 HARV. L. REv. 2565, 2583 n.120 (2003) (Atkins "removed" mental
retardation from the typical balancing of factors at sentencing and made this factor a "mandatory" basis for not
imposing the death penalty.).
65. Notably, the majority did not adopt Justice Scalia's view that retribution is based on the "depravity of
the crime" rather than on the mental capacity of the offender. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 350 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. But cf. Harris v. McAdory, 334 F.3d 665, 668 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2003) ("A cursory glance at Atkins reveals
that the Court was addressing the issue of mental retardation solely in the context of capital punishment.").
67. See infra notes 70-113 and accompanying text.
68. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. More recent opinions of the Justices are less approving of mandatory sentences. Cf. Harris v. United
States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002) (acknowledging that criticisms of mandatory minimums for failing to account for
the unique circumstances of offenders who warrant a lesser penalty "may be sound"); id. at 570 (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("Mandatory minimum statutes are fundamentally inconsistent with.. .a fair, honest, and rational
sentencing system."). See also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 245 (1998) (noting "risk of
unfairness" of mandatory minimums); cf. High Court Justice Crusadesfor Mercy, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 10, 2003, at
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shield mandatory sentences from constitutional scrutiny for their disproportionality.7 ° As noted above, Atkins held that, for proportionality purposes, mental retar7
dation is a mitigator of conclusive significance with respect to capital punishment;
thus, under the Eighth Amendment, the fact of mental retardation forecloses an
inquiry into whether to apply the death penalty. For non-capital cases, this suggests
that, although the mental retardation mitigator does not foreclose imposition of any
particular term of incarceration, it is still relevant to the proportionality, and hence
the constitutionality, of the sentence.72
The relevance of the mental retardation mitigator to the proportionality of a noncapital case sentence cannot be ignored simply by labeling the sentence as "mandatory." Because the relevance of this mitigator arises as a matter of constitutional
law, a mandatory minimum statute cannot make it any less relevant by cutting off
its consideration.73 To the contrary, under the rationale of Atkins, when a sentencing
judge determines that, as applied to a mentally retarded offender, a statutory
mandatory minimum term, be it a five, twenty, or fifty-year term of imprisonment,
duty to consider
might be "grossly disproportionate," that judge has a constitutional
74 If a judge concludes
whether the sentence might violate the Eighth Amendment.
A2 (At a speech at the ABA Convention in San Francisco, Justice Kennedy called for the repeal of mandatory
minimum sentences.).
Harmelin involved an average, first-time offender, not a mentally retarded defendant. 501 U.S. at 994.
The case therefore is not on point with respect to the validity of mandating punishments for offenders who are
"categorically less culpable than the average criminal." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
In addition, Justice Scalia's refusal to require consideration of mitigating factors in non-capital cases
largely relied on his separate opinion in that case, which found no support for a "gross disproportionality" precept
in the Eighth Amendment. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994 (opinion of Scalia, J., & Rehnquist, C.J.) ("As our earlier
discussion should make clear, th[e] claim [that mitigating factors must be considered in non-capital cases] has no
support in the text and history of the Eighth Amendment.") (emphasis added). But Justice Scalia's "earlier
discussion" was not the law then and has not gotten any closer to becoming law. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who had
joined Justice Scalia's separate opinion in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 961, recently agreed that the Eighth Amendment
contains a proportionality guarantee. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 13. Justice Souter, who joined Justice Scalia's Harmelin
opinion upholding a mandatory life sentence for a first-time drug offender, now questions whether a mandatory
sentence of twenty-five years for a recidivist who commits another felony is "constitutionally sound." Lockyer, 538
dissenting). Plainly, some wind has gone out of the sails of Justice Scalia's Harmelin opinion,
U.S. at 81 (Souter, J.,
and the current horizon does not promise him much of a fresh breeze. Indeed, Michigan recently repealed the very
statute upheld in Harmelin. See News Release, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, supra note 16; Fox
Butterfield, With Cash Tight, States Reassess Long Jail Terms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003, at Al (reporting that
many states are abandoning the "mandatory minimum" approach to crime).
70. Harmelin left open the extent to which future sentences might be successfully challenged on
disproportionality grounds. The splintered votes of the Justices in Harmelin failed to deliver even a plurality opinion
on whether the challenged sentence was "grossly disproportional." See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23 ("A majority of the
Court rejected Harmelin's claim that his sentence was so grossly disproportionate that it violated the Eighth
Amendment. The Court, however, could not agree on why his proportionality argument failed."); see also Lockyer,
538 U.S. at 70-77 (The lower court could not be faulted for unreasonably interpreting the Court's Eighth
Amendment precedents because the current jurisprudence is a "thicket," the "precise contours" of which remain
"unclear.").
71. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 ("'the Constitution places a substantive restriction on the State's power to take
the life' of a mentally retarded offender") (citation omitted).
72. Cf. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 333 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (facts that might not create
a "conclusive presumption" can nonetheless give rise to a "rebuttable presumption" because they are "still relevant"
to the analysis).
73. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (Constitution supersedes conflicting statutes).
74. See Harmelin,501 U.S. at 1017 (White, J., dissenting) (The Supreme Court has a "duty [under the Eighth
Amendment] to assess the constitutionality of punishments enacted by state legislative bodies.") (citing Marbury,
5 U.S. at 177); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868 (1992) ("this Court
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that the mandatory sentence in fact would be "grossly disproportionate" for that
offender, the judge must disregard the statute and reduce the sentence to avoid
imposing an unconstitutional sentence.7"
The present sentencing landscape confirms that mandatory sentences can be
problematic if applied to the mentally retarded.76 At the state level, many states
recognize the need to sentence mentally retarded offenders less severely than
average defendants.77 At least two states have legislation that allows departures from
mandatory minimums.78 All of these state laws, in effect, recognize a categorical
cannot and should not assume any exemption when duty requires it to decide a case in conformance with the
Constitution"); Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 300 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (in federal habeas cases, the
duty of adjudicating constitutional principles is left to the federal judge) (citation omitted); Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the power of judges "will permit, indeed require [them]
to 'disregard' a duly enacted statute if it is 'in opposition to the constitution') (citing Marbury, 5 U.S. at 178).
75. Cf. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 714 (striking down a state drug-trafficking sentence as excessive under
Eighth Amendment grounds).
76. It is unclear whether, as part of "gross disproportionality" analysis, the case law requires comparisons
of the petitioner's punishment with sentences imposed for the same offense in other jurisdictions, which in the
capital punishment context is viewed as the "clearest and most reliable" evidence on the question of proportionality.
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312. It can be argued that these comparisons should play no role in proportionality analysis. See
Michael J. O'Conner, Note, What Would Darwin Say? The Mis-Evolution of the Eighth Amendment, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2003) (arguing that "state legislation should be abandoned as the judicial measuring
stick" in Eighth Amendment cases).
In Ewing, the plurality opinion did not rest on state-by-state comparison of sentences to gauge the
California Three Strike Law's proportionality. To the contrary, the opinion cited approvingly Justice Kennedy's
statement that the Eighth Amendment "'did not mandate' comparative analysis 'within and between jurisdictions."'
538 U.S. at 23 (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Further, the opinion ignored the
dissent's Appendix listing States that punished the offense less severely than California.
In Rummel, a non-capital case, the Court rejected the defendant's reliance on a "comparison" of his term
of incarceration in Texas with the penalties for the same offense in the other forty-nine states and noted that the
Court's reliance on such comparative data in capital cases was inapposite: "It is one thing for a court to compare
those States that impose capital punishment for a specific offense with those States that do not. It is quite another
thing for a court to attempt to evaluate the position of any particular recidivist scheme within Rummel's complex
[interstate] matrix." Rummel, 445 U.S. at 279 (citation omitted).
For my part, I am skeptical whether the legislative sentencing landscape should ground Eighth
Amendment law: as laws change, the landscape is constantly shifting, and the laws can be good, bad, and even ugly.
See O'Conner, supra at 1416-17 (relying on legislation as an indicator of morality fails to recognize that laws can
be both moral and immoral); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315 (noting that "anticrime legislation is far more popular
than legislation providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime"). As discussed infra, note 114, a better
approach is to ground Eighth Amendment determinations in an inquiry into whether a given sentence measurably
advances legitimatepenological goals. Once this determination has been made, the legislative landscape can then
serve as a useful metric to determine how much a sentence should be reduced to avoid gross disproportionality. See
infra note 114 and accompanying text.
77. See State v. Hoffman, 745 So. 2d 985 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App. 1999) (affirming FLA. STAT. § 921.0016(4)(c)
downward guideline departure based on defendant's "inferior intelligence"); State v. Barsness, 473 N.W.2d 325,
329 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming thirty-six-month downward departure based in part on defendant's
"borderline" mental retardation); State v. Jarbath, 555 A.2d 559 (N.J. 1989) ("serious injustice" to impose any
prison time on mentally retarded offender, when the goals of deterrence would not be served); Commonwealth v.
Sheridan, 502 A.2d 694, 697 (Pa. Super Ct. 1985) (affirming downward departure to probation based in part on
defendant's "restricted intelligence"); see also S.A. Garcia & H.V. Steele, Mentally Retarded Offenders in the
Criminal Justice and Mental Retardation Services System in Florida: Philosophical,Placement and Treatment
Issues, 41 ARK. L. REV. 809, 832 (1988) (in clinical studies, "students gave mentally retarded offenders lighter
sentences than 'normal' offenders, regardless of the crime committed").
78. See State v. Keith, 955 P.2d 966, 969 (Mont. 2000) ("[section] 46-18-222(2), MCA, does permit the
sentencing court to reject the mandatory minimum sentence if it determines that the defendant's mental capacity
was significantly impaired during the commission of the offense"); People v. Waters, 595 N.E.2d 1369, 1375 (ill.
App. Ct. 1992) (construing Illinois law to permit a court to sentence below the mandatory minimum for a mentally
retarded offender. "While the criminal acts of a mentally disabled person are not per se excused, our society has
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difference. This certainly validates an initial judgment that the application of a
sentence prescribed for typical cases could be "grossly disproportional" when
applied to the mentally retarded.79
8
Similarly, at the federal level, the United States Sentencing Guidelines " provide
that, if the defendant committed the offense "while suffering from a significantly
reduced mental capacity," a sentence below the guideline range may be warranted
one of
where the offense did not involve violence." This makes mental deficiency
82 Thus, the
departure.
the Guidelines' "encouraged" grounds for downward
Guidelines expressly recognize that mentally retarded defendants are categorically
outside the "heartland" of typical cases.83
In fact, for a federal judge, analyzing whether and to what extent a mandatory
term of incarceration is disproportionate for a mentally retarded offender is akin to
evaluating whether a case is so "outside the heartland" of the Sentencing Guidelines
that a defendant is entitled to a downward departure below the range mandated by
the applicable Sentencing Guideline.' The Guidelines provide that' 5a departure is
appropriate "where conduct significantly differs from the norm." Analytically,
determining whether conduct "significantly differs from the norm" is similar to
finding, as the Supreme Court did in Atkins, that a defendant is "categorically" less
culpable than the "average" offender.86
For federal appellate courts, review of the magnitude of a departure from the
mandatory minimum would be similar to review of district court departures from the
Sentencing Guidelines. The Sentencing Guideline statute requires reviewing courts
to examine whether a departure by the district court "departs to an unreasonable

evolved to an understanding that because of a disability a sentence of imprisonment may not serve the ends of
justice and the interests of society and the offender.") (citation omitted); cf. State v. Silverman, 977 P. 2d 1186, 1190
(Or. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing departure below the mandatory minimum where "nothing about defendant's
circumstances or mental health" made the sentence more shocking than when applied in average cases).
79. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS (2003) (describing how state prisons in the United States are ill-equipped to incarcerate mentally ill
inmates).
80. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2003).
81. Id. § 5K2.13.
82. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996).
83. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, cmt. (b) (2003).
84. See id. § 5K2.0 et seq.
85. See id. ch.l, pt. A, § 4(b); Koon, 518 U.S. at 96, 109. If a factor is a "discouraged" basis for departure
under the Guidelines, a departure is still appropriate if the factor "is present to an exceptional degree." Koon, 518
U.S. at 96. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 250 F. Supp. 2d 317, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting downward
departure to defendant whose mind was "somewhat slow"; "a limited period of incarceration will sufficiently serve
the twin aims of punishment and deterrence"); United States v. Adonis, 744 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1990) (granting
mentally retarded defendant a downward departure).
86. A decision to depart downward from the prescribed Guidelines range is often based on a mitigating
circumstance that "somehow reduces a defendant's guilt or culpability." United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143,
1148 (3rd Cir. 1993) (listing various grounds for downward departure under the Sentencing Guidelines). Likewise,
a finding that a punishment is "excessive" under the Eighth Amendment involves a determination that the
punishment is not warranted in relation to the defendant's culpability. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318 (for capital
punishment purposes, deficiencies of the mentally retarded diminish their "personal culpability"); Cooper Indus.,
Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 434-35 (2001) (in evaluating the proportionality of punitive
damages or fines under the Eighth Amendment, the Court has focused in part on "the degree of the defendant's
reprehensibility or culpability") (citing United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337, 339, 340-43 (1998) (striking
down fine as excessive under Eighth Amendment on account of defendant's "minimal level of culpability")).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

degree from the applicable guidelines range. ,87 Applying this standard, appellate
courts have turned to the Guidelines as a reference for what constitutes a "reasonable" departure, sometimes even requiring district courts to make an analogy to
other Guidelines sections to justify their departures.8 8
This metric could be applied to determine whether, for Eighth Amendment
purposes, a district court correctly sentenced a mentally retarded offender below a
mandatory minimum.8 9 The Guidelines provide a two-level to four-level downward
sentence adjustment for defendants who play a "minor" or "minimal" role in the
offense.9" This is an objective measure of how a defendant's diminished culpability
for an offense should weigh in relation to his overall sentence. Both the Eighth
Amendment concern here and the Guidelines role adjustment provision relate to the
"level of culpability" of an offender.9 ' One way of measuring the reduced level of
culpability of a mentally retarded offender in non-capital cases is by looking to the
way the Guidelines reduce punishment based on an offender's limited responsibility
for an offense, since criminal responsibility and culpability are related concepts.92
Thus, a mentally retarded offender typically ought to be eligible for a two-to-four
level downward adjustment from the mandatory minimum.
For example, a mentally retarded offender convicted of importing more than 500
grams of cocaine, after pleading guilty and receiving a three-level "acceptance of
responsibility" sentence reduction, typically would have an offense level of twentythree, i.e., for a first-time offender, a sentence of forty-six to fifty-seven months.93
Statutorily, however, he would be subject to a mandatory five-year sentence.94
Under the rule proposed here, if the offender were mentally retarded, a federal
sentencing judge could borrow from the Guidelines and reduce the sentence (to
avoid a conflict with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of "cruel and unusual
punishment") by the equivalent of three Guidelines levels (between the two and
four-level reductions provided by the Guidelines for offenders with diminished

87. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3) (2003).
88. See Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence That Undermines
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,76 NOTRE DAME L REV. 21, 57 nn. 134, 135 (2000) (collecting cases); see also
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 338-39 (noting that the applicable penalties under Sentencing Guidelines "confirm
[defendant's] minimal level of culpability" and the excessiveness of his fine under the Eighth Amendment).
Analogous statutes can also provide a useful metric to determine the magnitude of a sentence reduction. Cf, e.g.,
United States v. Fan, 36 F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Reference to an analogous statute is a well-established
method to determine the magnitude of an upward departure.").
89. See Henderson, 258 F.3d at 714 (relying on the lesser punishment under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for an equivalent offense as support for a decision to strike down a State drug-trafficking sentence on
Eighth Amendment grounds); id. at 713 (relying on the lesser sentence under the State's advisory sentencing
guidelines as a basis for striking down the mandatory sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds).
90. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B 1.2 (2003).
91. See id. § 3B1.2, cmt. 4 (minimal role adjustment is meant to apply to defendants who are "among the
least culpable" of those involved in the offense).
92. See Smith v. Francis, 474 U.S. 925, 929 (Marshall, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (for
mentally retarded offenders the "level of personal responsibility and moral guilt" is lower than for average
offenders) (citation omitted).
93. UNrrED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D 1.1(7) (2003); id. § 3E 1.1; id. ch. 5, pt. A, table.
94. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2)(B) (2003).
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culpability). 95 Thus, the mentally retarded offender's offense level would now be
five
twenty. For a first-time offender, the sentence has dropped from the mandatory
97
years to thirty-three to forty-one months,96 a reduction of roughly two years.
Admittedly, the analogy to Guidelines departures is not perfect because the size
of district court departures has been treated as a case-specific determination, for
98
which appellate review has been "quite deferential"; whereas a determination that
a sentence is "grossly disproportional," like any ruling anchored in the Constitution,
is binding for a generality of cases. 99 Thus, whereas departure caselaw left flexibility
for future courts to reach different results-even under analogous facts-a
constitutional determination is binding on future cases, and, in that respect, rigid.
This difference, however, largely reflects how courts to date have interpreted the
review provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act; an approach that is arguably
incorrect"° and, in any event, is bound to change under the requirement of the 2003
"Feeney Amendment" to the Sentencing Reform Act that appellate courts review
lower court departures "de novo."'O' Just as, post-Feeney Amendment, appellate
review of a departure will provide guidance to district courts regarding the correct
magnitude of a departure,0 2 appellate decisions concerning mandatory minimums
provide useful benchmarks on the constituthat are "grossly disproportional" will
3
tional boundaries for these cases.°

95. See United States v. Cordova, 337 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 2003) (reversing fifteen-level departure
based on the defendant's reduced mental capacity and holding that on remand a two to four level departure would
be appropriate).
96. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GutDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, table (2003).
97. One could argue that Harmelin precludes interpreting the Eighth Amendment to require a three-year
sentence for a drug trafficking offense involving more than 500 grams of cocaine, even for a mentally retarded
offender, since Harmelin left standing a life sentence without parole for a defendant convicted of possession of 672
grams of cocaine. 501 U.S. 957. However, as explained in supra note 16, the holding of Harmelin was limited to
the only ground for decision on which five Justices agreed. This narrow ground did not address the proportionality
of a life sentence for possession of 672 grams of cocaine. Consequently, Harmelin is not binding precedent on the
question of whether a life sentence for possession of 672 grams of cocaine is "grossly disproportional." In Lockyer,
the Court analyzed the "contours" of its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, and, while recognizing that the
defendant's sentence and the facts in that case fell "in between" Solem and Rummel, the opinion did not even
mention the sentence and facts of Harmelin. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 74. This omission confirms that the Harmelin
sentence is not a benchmark for Eighth Amendment gross disproportionality law.
98. See Berman, supra note 88, at 57, n.133.
99. See, e.g., Braun v. Powell, 77 F. Supp. 2d 973, 996 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (decision of a court of appeals
interpreting the Constitution as binding on any federal district court within that circuit), rev'd on other grounds, 227
F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2000).
100. See Berman, supra note 88, at 99 ("[T]here would be considerable benefits from refocusing departure
jurisprudence to be highly discretionary and deferential concerning the threshold decision to depart, but rigorous
in its examination and review of the extent of departures.").
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2003).
102. See Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who's Afraid of the Federal Judiciary? Why Congress' Fear of Judicial
Sentencing DiscretionMay Undermine a Generationof Reform, CHAMPION, June 2003, at II (Feeney Amendment
will force appellate courts to provide district courts with "more certain guidance on when and to what degree
departures are warranted").
103. This body of law would resemble the "common law of sentencing" that some commentators believe
should evolve alongside the caselaw interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines. See Berman, supra note 88, at 35 n.46
(citing Norval Morris, Towards PrincipledSentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 283-85 (1977)); Douglas A. Berman,
A Common Lawfor This FederalAge of Sentencing: The Need and Opportunityfor JudicialLawmaking, 11 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 98 (1999).
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It bears noting that not all disproportionate sentences raise constitutional
concerns; only "grossly" disproportionate ones." "Plain error" analysis can inform
courts concerning the threshold at which a mandatory sentence becomes so "grossly
disproportional" that it violates the proportionality principle. "Plain error" requires
reversal of a sentence on appeal, even when the defendant failed to object to the
error in the lower court, because the error is not only "plain" under applicable law,
but also because the error impacts the defendant's "substantial rights" and "seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings."' 0 5 A
"grossly disproportional" sentence is like a sentence infected by "plain
error"
because it substantially prejudices the individual defendant and does so in a manner
that undermines the legitimacy of the proceedings." 6
The case law indicates that "plain error" can occur when the defendant was
sentenced under the wrong guideline range and the resulting error affected the
defendant's sentence by no less than ten percent."°7 This ten percent margin of error
can be applied in the "grossly disproportional" context. Thus, if a judge determines
that the diminished culpability of a mentally retarded offender warrants a downward
departure but the departure would be less than ten percent of the sentence, the
Eighth Amendment would not require the judge to adjust the sentence. However, if
the judge determines that the diminished culpability of the offender requires a
departure of ten percent or more from the otherwise applicable sentence, the Eighth
Amendment would require the judge to grant a departure because the sentence
104. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23 ("the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime
and sentence [but] forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime") (quoting
Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
One could, of course, interpret the Eighth Amendment to require stricter proportionality than just
avoidance of "grossly" unfair sentences, since "proportionality in sentencing" is now widely recognized as a
fundamental principle of sentencing laws. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A,
intro., n. 3. (2003).
105. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,735 (1993) (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160
(1936)).
106. See United States v. Castillo-Casiano, 198 F.3d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1999) (plain error where district court
erroneously believed it lacked authority to depart; "sentencing errors that might have affected the defendant's
sentence undermine the fairness of sentencing proceedings"); cf United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 634 (2002)
("the fairness and integrity of the criminal justice system depends on meting out to those inflicting the greatest harm
on society the most severe punishments").
107. See United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 205, 207 (3rd Cir. 2001) (plain error where defendant
erroneously sentenced to 162 months but correct guideline range was 140 to 175 months); United States v. Ford,
88 F.3d 1350, 1356 (4th Cir. 1996) (plain error where defendant sentenced to 360 months under wrong guideline
would have received a 324-month sentence if correctly sentenced); United States v. Osuna, 189 F.3d 1289, 1295
(10th Cir. 1999) (plain error where defendant sentenced to fifty-one months and guideline range was forty-six to
fifty-seven months, not fifty-one to sixty-three months); United States v. Wallace, 32 F.3d 1171, 1174 (7th Cir.
1994) (plain error where defendant sentenced to 168 months should have been eligible for 151-month low-end
sentence). Plain error generally occurs when a defendant is sentenced under the wrong Guideline range. Knight, 266
F.3d at 207. Generally, application of the wrong Guidelines range results in a ten-percent error. For example, for
an offender with Criminal History Category I, the low-end of the Guideline range is seventy months for an offense
level of twenty-seven and sixty-three months for a level twenty-six. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A, table (2003). If a defendant is originally sentenced at the low-end under level twenty-seven
and then (after reversal on appeal for "plain error") is resentenced at the low end of the guideline range for level
twenty-six, the difference between the two low-end sentences is seven months. Seven months represents ten percent
of the original seventy-month sentence. This percentage difference between low-ends from offense level to offense
level is greater for offense levels eighteen and below, but the ten percent differential holds for most offense levels
in the table. It therefore seems like a fair measure of "plain error." But see United States v. Guerrero, 5 F.3d 868
(5th Cir. 1993) (a discrepancy of only one offense level militates against a finding of plain error).
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would be grossly disproportionate for the offender's degree10 8of culpability, even if
the applicable sentence is a minimum mandated by statute.
To be sure, this ten percent line, and the Guidelines-guided metric for departure
discussed above, may at first appear to be somewhat arbitrary. But, as Justice
Stevens noted in his dissent in Ewing v. California,1°9 courts are "constantly" called
upon to draw lines in a variety of constitutional contexts (e.g., punitive damages
under due process, speedy trial delays under the Sixth Amendment);" once the lines
are drawn, they have a way of no longer seeming arbitrary, but of laying down
"constitutional boundaries.'
CONCLUSION
Atkins recognized that the Eighth Amendment circumscribes the range of
punishments that can be imposed on offenders who have diminished mental
culpability, and this principle has force in cases where the prosecution seeks to
impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment on mentally retarded offenders
in non-capital cases. In the future, it is conceivable that mitigators other than mental
retardation could systematically call into question the proportionality of a mandatory
sentence.112 A sentencing court could conclude that another category of ameliorating

108. Although ten percent might not seem "excessive" in the absolute, in the Eighth Amendment context it
is a fair benchmark of "gross disproportionality." Under the Sixth Amendment, "any" amount of jail time is
constitutionally significant. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001). Moreover, even a "minimal amount"
of unwarranted additional jail time is sufficiently prejudicial to support a finding that defense counsel's assistance
was constitutionally deficient. Id.
109. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 33-34.
111. See, e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "The severity of petitioner's crime
brings his sentence within the constitutionalboundariesestablishedby ourpriordecisions." Id. at 1004 (emphasis
added).
The current "constitutional boundaries" leave plenty of room for a determination that a mandatory
minimum is unconstitutional as applied to mentally retarded offenders (or other offenders who can show that they
are categorically less culpable than average offenders). Atkins' holding that the most extreme sanction is excessive
when applied to less culpable offenders can be read in conjunction with Solem, which held that a life sentence
without parole was disproportional for a recidivist. Solem, 463 U.S. 277. Recidivists constitute the most culpable
category of offenders. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24 (career criminals are "the class of offenders who pose the greatest
threat to public safety"). If the life sentence in Solem was grossly disproportional for recidivists, it surely can also
be grossly disproportional for mentally retarded offenders. Putting Atkins and Solem together, it is fair to infer that
punishments short of death, such as mandatory terms of imprisonment, can be grossly disproportional, especially
when applied to the mentally retarded.
Some might object that so many defendants will be able to claim that they are categorically less culpable
than average offenders that the rule proposed here would undermine statutory mandatory minimums. However,
judges should be able to discern whether a defendant has established that legitimate penological goals are not
advanced by the imposition of the mandated minimum punishment. The defendant would have to show that his
circumstances truly are categorically different from the average offender's. In any event, the demise of mandatory
minimums may not be something to be regretted. See ABA to Study Federal Sentencing, ABA J. & REP., Aug. 15,
2003 (ABA President announces that a committee will study whether mandatory minimum sentences "should be
discarded"); supra note 70 (discussing Supreme Court Justices' doubts about the fairness of mandatory sentences);
Butterfield, supra note 69.
112. See Roper v. Simmons, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1171 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2004)
(No. 03-633) (granting certiorari to review whether the execution of persons under the age of seventeen is cruel and
unusual); Robin M.A. Weeks, Note, ComparingChildren to the Mentally Retarded: How the Decision in Atkins
v. Virginia Will Affect the Execution of Juvenile Offenders, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 451,475-82 (2003) (discussing the
possible extension of Atkins to prohibit the execution of juveniles); Edmund P. Power, Too Young to Die: The
Juvenile Death Penalty after Atkins v. Virginia, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 93 (2002) (advocating the prohibition of the
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circumstances rises to constitutional stature by finding, as the Supreme Court did in
Atkins, that the punishment does not measurably advance legitimate penological
goals." 3 Contrary to Justice Scalia's view, these are matters about which courts are
' 14
able to "speak intelligently."
There will be room for disagreement about whether punishments fail to
measurably advance legitimate penological goals. 115 As this debate unfolds, the

execution of juveniles based on Atkins); Margaret Talbot, The Executioner's I.Q. Test, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2003,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 30 (arguing that individuals other than the mentally retarded may be entitled to more lenient
treatment under the criminal law).
113. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321 (execution of the mentally retarded does not "measurably advance" the goals
of the death penalty).
114. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring). As explained below, a court, in fact, can judge whether
a penological goal is legitimate and whether a punishment measurably advances that goal. For instance, in Ewing
the plurality upheld California's Three Strikes Law based on data that showed (1) the crime rate of recidivists
justified imposing sentences designed to incapacitate and (2) a drop in the crime rate after repeat felons were
incapacitated. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 26-28.
Justice Scalia himself, when pressed, has been able to explain why, contrary to the majority, he believes
a particular punishment does further a penological goal. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[if]
mental retardation does not render the offender morally blameless, there is no basis for saying that the death penalty
is never appropriate retribution... .But surely the deterrent effect of a penalty is adequately vindicated if it
successfully deters many, but not all, of the target class.") (citations omitted). Justice Scalia is not alone in
grounding his Eighth Amendment positions in a judgment concerning whether a punishment advances rational
penological goals. In Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, __,
123 S. Ct. 2162, 2170 (2003), the Court linked its
decision concerning the validity of prison restrictions on visitation of inmates under the Eighth Amendment to its
earlier discussion of their validity under the First Amendment. This earlier discussion considered whether the
regulations bore "a rational relation to legitimate penological interests." Id. at __,
123 S. Ct. at 2167 (emphasis
added). This inquiry into whether legitimate penological interests are being furthered is, in fact, a theme in Eighth
Amendment cases. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25 (plurality opinion) ("[a] sentence can have a variety of justifications,
such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation"); id. (the valid goal of the Three Strikes Law is to
incapacitate repeat felons); id. at 1190 ("Ewing's incapacitation is justified by the State's public-safety interest in
incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons");Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (examining "the relationship between mental
retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty"); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1003 ("the Michigan
legislature could with reason conclude that the threat posed to the individual and society by possession of [a] large
amount of cocaine [warrants] a life sentence without parole"); id. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (failure of a
sentence to "even purport to serve a rehabilitative function" as to this offense was "irrational").
In the future, the Eighth Amendment should be expressly grounded in considerations regarding whether
the punishment at issue is measurably advancing legitimate penological goals. This approach, it bears noting, is
consistent with the factors federal judges should consider generally when sentencing. See Berman, supra note 88,
at 8 n.64 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994)); United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 370 (7th Cir. 1996) (consistency
with the goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution is "a reason in favor of a departure"); United States v.
Godfrey, 22 F.3d 1048, 1058 (11 th Cir. 1994) (departure not justified because sentence was not excessive in relation
to penological goals). It is also consonant with the approach some commentators are urging in the administration
of departures under the Sentencing Guidelines. See Berman, supra note 88, at 96, 107 (arguing that decisions
regarding departures from the Sentencing Guidelines should "focus primarily" on the "purposes of punishment"
and the "traditional goals of sentencing"); accord Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals,
the False Trail of Uniformity and Process, and the Way Back Home, 24 S.C. L. REV. 649, 651 (2003) (arguing that
judges making departures have merely been going "by the book" and should instead consider "traditional sentencing
goals").
115. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (acknowledging "in all fairness" that the plurality
failed to demonstrate that a sentence of twenty-five years to life was proportionate for the theft of three golf clubs);
Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 82 (Souter, J., dissenting) (consecutive twenty-five-year to life sentences not proportionate for
two thefts of a handful of videotapes); Harmelin,501 U.S. at 1028 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (failure of sentence to
"even purport to serve a rehabilitative function" was "irrational"); cf. United States v. Uphoff,
232 F.3d 624 (8th
Cir. 2000) (imposition of five-year mandatory sentence on defendant with mental illness did not violate Eighth
Amendment); United States v. Yirkovsky, 276 F.3d 384 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Arnold, J., dissenting from denial
of en banc review) (noting that on its face the mandatory sentence imposed was "grossly disproportional"); Daniel
Bergner, When Forever Is Far Too Long, N.Y. TtIMES, June 17, 2003, at A27 (suggesting that lifetime prisoners
should be given a second chance at freedom).
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Eighth Amendment will "draw[] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."" 6 These evolving standards ought to
create a jurisprudence that strives to keep the "least deserving" offenders free of
"cruel and unusual" punishments.

116. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (citation omitted).

